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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR WRITERS
EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOYERNMENT*
The United States Government engages in the preparation, process-
ing, and printing of written materials on an enormous scale.' Much
of the material it prints originates through the hired efforts of gov-
ernment personnel, and the Government undoubtedly is the largest
single employer of writers in the country. The Government also pub-
lishes from other sources-from the limitless realm of copyrighted
and uncopyrighted materials produced by persons not acting within
the paid scope of government employment. From whatever source it
publishes, the Government has no fear of being sued for infringement
of copyright since the shield of sovereign immunity in this area still
remains unpierced.2 In exchange for the privilege of freely publishing
whatever it wishes, the Government may be considered to have given a
corresponding privilege to the public at large, i.e., the privilege to
republish freely "any publication of the United States Government."
This privilege exists by virtue of section 8 of the Copyright Law of
1947 which states that "no copyright shall subsist . .. in any publi-
cation of the United States Government, or any reprint, in whole or
in part, thereof . . .3
Manifestly, it would not be a fair policy to permit publication of
copyrighted materials by the Government to destroy the copyrights
previously existing on such materials, and Congress recognized this
by annexing a proviso to section 8 specifically precluding any "abridg-
ment or annulment" of a copyright holder's rights and privileges when
his copyrighted material is published or republished by the Govern-
ment.4 However, the section says nothing regarding the rights and
privileges of the person whose uncopyrighted work is published by
* This note, by Donald L. Gunnels, received first place award in the 1960
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition for the best essay on copyright law at
Washington University School of Law. This competition is conducted annually
at law schools throughout the United States, under auspices of the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1. It has been estimated that in a recent average year the total number of
copies of all classes of Government publications exceeded thirteen billion. Note,
24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 423 (1956).
2. 61 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958). See Lanman v. United States,
27 Ct. Cl. 260 (1892). See also Note, 24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 423, 425 (1956).
3. 61 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958). This section is a re-enactment
of § 7 of the Copyright Act of 1909, with a slight modification not pertinent here.
Another prohibition against copyrighting of Government publications is contained
in 28 Stat. 608 (1895), 44 U.S.C. § 58 (1958).
4. 61 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
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the Government. Another significant gap is that there is no statutory
definition of the term "any publication of the United States Govern-
ment," nor has any comprehensive judicial definition been offered.'
The federal employee who engages in original writing, either voca-
tionally or avocationally, runs a double risk of being unable to acquire
copyright protection of his material. By virtue of section 8 of the
Copyright Law, the material he produces, if handled, duplicated or
printed by the Government, may be held to fit the category of the
uncopyrightable "government publication." Prediction of whether it
will do so is made difficult by the definitional hiatus mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. The need for a comprehensive and workable
definition of "any publication" of the Government which would render
prediction easier for both government and non-government employees
has been adequately treated elsewhere," and will not be further ex-
plored here. The second, and more substantial, risk of the govern-
ment employee is that his literary products may be held to belong to
the Government-and hence to the public to use as it will-because
of the fact that their production in some way arose out of, or was
connected with, the employee's paid duties or job functions. Should
the government employee stand in any different position than a pri-
vately employed person with respect to the literary property rights in
his original creations and compositions? If not, how close a connec-
tion between the material and the employee's paid duties should be
required, as a general rule in both situations, to vest in the employer
all property rights to the material? This note will examine these
problems and others related thereto in the context of various fact
situations which have arisen or may arise in the cases. What is be-
lieved to be the most rational and realistic approach toward a fair
solution of the problems will be indicated.
The Copyright Law provides that its protection is available to "the
author or proprietor of any work made the subject of copyright by
this Act.... ." That author or proprietor includes the employer of an
author in the case of "works made for hire" is specifically provided
by section 26:1 It is therefore clear that the employer of a person
hired to create specific copyrightable materials has the exclusive right
to copyright such materials when they are produced.,
There seems to be no doubt that the Government could, if it wished,
assert its prerogative as an employer under the act and claim the
5. See Howell, The Copyright Law 42 (2d ed. 1948).
6. Note, 24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 423, 440-44 (1956). See Ball, The Law of
Copyright and Literary Property § 23 (1944); Nicholson, Manual of Copyright
Practice 143 (1945).
7. 35 Stat. 1077 (1909), 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1958).
8. 35 Stat. 1087 (1909), 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
9. Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property § 81, at 182 (1944).
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right to copyright all of its "works made for hire." In England,
Parliament has secured to the Crown the privilege to copyright these
and other classes of government documents. 0 Authorities in this
country have expressed the belief that our own Government could act
similarly if it so desired.?' As a matter of practice and policy, how-
ever, our Government has not exercised its power to claim a monopoly
on its documents or published materials, with one very limited excep-
tion in the case of certain publications of the Postmaster General. 12
And, as previously indicated, Congress has by section 8 of the Copy-
right Law broadly forbidden the copyrighting of "any publication of
the United States Government."1 3 The policy reason underlying the
Government's reluctance to acquire copyrights lies in the feeling that
the public-at-large is entitled to make whatever use it desires of mate-
rials and publications produced at government expense, inasmuch as
the Government is supported by the people. 4 Apparently, Congress
felt that this interest of the public outweighs any need to prevent pos-
sible abuses which may occur through distortion, misquotation or ex-
cessive pricing of government materials when they are privately
reproduced.
Since the Government does not obtain copyrights in its written
materials, thus placing them in the public domain so far as they may
be accessible to the public, the government employee who engages in
original writing which is in some way connected with his paid job
activities faces the distinct possibility that he may be denied any right
to prevent free use and reproduction by the public. This possibility
exists, it must be noted, independently of the "Government publica-
tion" test of section 8 of the Copyright Law, by the mere fact of the
master-servant relationship. For the premise seems undisputed that
the master of the public servant is the public, not the Government as
a separately existing entity.
The question therefore arises whether the government employee
should be considered to possess the same rights and privileges regard-
ing his literary products as does a privately employed person. The
test applicable in the instance of a privately employed person is not
altogether clear and undisputed in all situations, but in general may
be said to depend upon whether the material in question was produced
10. Crown Copyright Act of 1911, 1-2 Geo. V, ch. 46 § 18. See Copinger, Law
of Copyright ch. VI (6th ed. 1927) for general discussion of "Crown Copyrights."
11. Drone, Law of Property in Intellectual Productions 162, 164 (1879); Note,
24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 423, 433-37 (1956).
12. See 17 U.S.C § 8 (1958).
13. See note 3 supra.
14. See discussion of policy factors both for and against Government obtain-
ment of copyrights in Note, 24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 423, 433-40 (1956).
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as an essential part of the employee's paid duties,5 or was called for
expressly or impliedly in the contract of employment;16 if so, the em-
ployer is vested with the literary property rights in the material, to
the exclusion of the employee.
In considering the positions of both the government employee and
the private one, a ready classification may be made according to the
capacity in which the material was produced. At one extreme, it may
have been produced in the employee's paid capacity, as the very thing
that lie was hired and paid specifically to do. Here there appears to
be no conceivable basis upon which to distinguish the government em-
ployee from the private one. There is perhaps a theoretical difference
between the positions of the Government and a private employer in
that the latter will in most cases obtain copyright protection of the
material for which he has paid, whereas the Government will not do
so in any case. But certainly this does not change the picture in any
way respecting the relative positions and rights of the person em-
ployed by the Government and the one employed privately. In no
discovered case has it been doubted that if an employee is hired and
paid to produce the material in question, he thereby fully surrenders
any right to seek extra compensation by claiming property rights in
the material. Such was the holding in the early case of Heine v.
Appleton.T The plaintiff was an artist who was employed by Commo-
dore Perry to accompany the famous expedition to Japan. He was
hired with the explicit agreement that whatever pictures or drawings
he might produce during the journey would belong solely to the Gov-
ernment. He prepared numerous drawings which were printed into
a government report of the expedition. Since the drawings were made
pursuant to the terms of the employment contract, they were held to
be government property in which plaintiff could assert no claim under
the copyright law or otherwise.
Obviously, it should be of no consequence whether the employer,
either government or private, chooses ever to publish the material
15. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Yardley v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686
(1940); Werckneister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 Fed. 808 (S.D.N.Y.
1894); Brown v. Moll Co., 20 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Roberts v. Myers,
20 Fed. Cag. 898 (No. 11,906) (C.C.Mass. 1860); Little v. Gould, 15 Fed. Cas.
604 (No. 8,394) (N.D.N.Y. 1851).
16. Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 608 (1872); Nat'l Comics Publications
v. Fawvcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594 (1951); Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp.
771 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. 26 (No. 8,136) (C.C.Mass.
1869); Edward Thompson Co. v. Clark, 109 N.Y.S. 700 (Sup. Ct. 1904); Lawrence
v. Afialo, [1904] A.C. 17, 1 B.R.C. 314. See Colliery Eng'r Co. v. United Corre-
spondence Schools Co., 94 Fed. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1899). Cf. W. H. Anderson Co. v.
Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928) (semble).
17. 11 Fed. Cas. 1031 (No. 6,324) (S.D.N.Y. 1857).
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produced by the employee, so long as the latter's compensation does
not depend upon it. This, of course, is not to say that an employee
could not acquire full property rights by way of donation if the em-
ployer chose to make him a gift of the material, over and above his
regular compensation. The same would be true regardless of whether
the person was a government or a private employee.
The private master-servant test is applicable a fortiori at the oppo-
"site extreme where the government employee brings the material into
being solely on his own time and at his own expense with no connec-
tion whatever between the subject matter of the material and his paid
job functions. Here it is indisputable that any individual should enjoy
the fruits and benefits of his voluntary, non-salaried efforts regardless
of whether he works for the Government or a private employer. To
rule otherwise could only result in stifling rather than stimulation of
individual initiative toward creativity.18
More problematical are cases which lie in the "gray area" between
the extremes of material produced wholly within the scope of the
employee's paid duties and material produced wholly outside such
scope. For example, the material might have been partially or wholly
produced during working hours, or its subject matter might bear some
relationship to the employee's job activities, or it might have been pro-
duced with both of these factors present. Should cases involving gov-
ernment employees require a more stringent test regarding literary
property rights than ones involving persons privately employed?
A recent case answering this question negatively is Public Affairs
Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 9 decided by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. The holding was that Vice Ad-
miral Hyman G. Rickover of the United States Navy, who had written
and delivered public speeches and distributed copies of them to cer-
tain persons and groups, 20 retained exclusive property rights in his
speeches so that he could secure copyrights and prevent plaintiff and
others from freely reproducing them. Plaintiff was a private pub-
lishing firm which sought a declaratory judgment to hold the speeches
to be in the public domain. The main argument of plaintiff was based
on the premise that if a government employee's literary products are
closely enough connected with his official duties, such products are
18. See Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 603-04
(1959) ; Mayberry v. Newell, 200 Iowa 458, 204 N.W. 413 (1925).
19. 177 F. Supp. 601 (1959).
20. This distribution was held to be only a limited publication which did not
constitute an abandonment of literary property or a dedication to the public.
On this subject, see American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
See also Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property § 60 (1944); Howell,
The Copyright Law 56-61 (2d ed. 1948).
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in the public domain by virtue of the employment relationship. 21 It
was contended that the speeches were outgrowths of the Admiral's
government activities, and were in part prepared on "government
time" with the aid of government facilities. Apparently, a govern-
ment secretary assisted in preparation of the manuscripts, and gov-
ernment duplicating machines were used to prepare the copies.22 Some
of the speeches pertained to subjects related to the Admiral's official
job position in the atomic submarine program, while other speeches
were wholly unrelated to his official duties, being concerned with
problems in education.
In deciding against plaintiff, the court did not distinguish the
speeches which pertained to the Admiral's official duties and those
which did not. Nor was any importance attached to the facts regard-
ing use of "government time" and facilities in preparation of the
manuscripts and copies. If the Navy Department had wished to do so,
it could have put a stop to such use "by regulations or other intramural
action."-- The court chose to place controlling force on the fact that
preparation and delivery of the speeches were wholly voluntary efforts
on Admiral Rickover's part, and "no part of his official duties. '24 It
was noted that material produced by a government employee can be
classified according to the capacity in which the employee produced it,
i.e., either wholly within or wholly without the scope of his paid,
obligatory job duties, or somewhere between those poles. Admiral
Rickover's speeches were believed to lie in the intermediate category.
The fact that the court considered the private master-servant test
applicable throughout the whole range between the extremes is clearly
shown by the following language:
[H]is rights are not affected by the fact that he may be a Gov-
ernment officer or employee. In fact it is in the public interest
for the Government to encourage intellectual development of its
officers and employees, and to look with favor upon their making
literary and scientific contributions. It is a matter of common
knowledge that this course is followed by private industry.
25
And similarly, "no one sells or mortgages all the products of his brain
to his employer by the mere fact of employment. The officer or em-
ployee still remains a free agent."",
On the facts, the result obtained in the Rickover case seems unques-
tionably correct, if the court's rationale equating the positions of gov-
21. 177 F. Supp. at 602.
22. Id. at 604.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 604-05.
26. Id. at 604.
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eminent employees and privately employed persons is accepted as
sound. The court pointed out that there was no prior appellate case
as precedent which had decided the question presented, but felt that
its view was strongly supported by the Supreme Court's ruling in the
case of United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,27 a case involving
a patent controversy. There two scientists employed by the United
States Bureau of Standards had developed an original type of radio in-
strument while in the regular course of performing their official duties
in a government laboratory with use of government tools and equip-
ment. In upholding the scientists' rights to patents on the invention
against the claim of the Government, the Supreme Court relied upon
the fact that the scientists' employment was general, and the inven-
tion of the instrument was not the precise subject of their contract
of employment.
The holding of the Rickover case is in accord with that in Sherrill
v. Grieves,28 decided in 1929 by what was then the trial court of gen-
eral jurisdiction for the District of Columbia. This was a copyright
infringement action growing out of the following facts. Plaintiff had
been an army officer engaged as an instructor in an army school at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There was no suitable textbook for the
course he taught, which was military topography. He prepared ma-
terial for such a book during his leisure, off-duty hours and not as
an incident to his instruction duties. Before he completed the book
or obtained a copyright, a part of the material was reproduced in
pamphlet form at a government printshop and distributed to students
at the school, with the knowledge and permission of plaintiff. Later
plaintiff brought the book out in complete form and obtained a copy-
right. Defendant challenged plaintiff's right to copyright the part of
the book reproduced in the Fort Leavenworth pamphlet. The court,
in holding that the Government's printing of the pamphlet did not
divest plaintiff of any of his rights, said plaintiff was at that time
like a professor at any private institution of learning, who is not
obliged to reduce his lectures to writing; and if he does so, they do
not become the property of the institution employing himY' Thus, the
plaintiff was held to have been situated like a privately employed
person who had not produced the material in question because of any
of his duties or job obligations, in the same way that the court in the
Rickover case identified the Admiral with a private employee.
A case which, although not departing from the private master-
servant test, used a different approach from that of the Rickover and
Sherrill cases and which obtained an opposite result was Sawyer v.
27. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
28. 57 Wash. Law Rep. 286 (Sup. Ct. D.C.).
29. Id. at 290.
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Crowell Publishing Co., 0 decided by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. The facts are perhaps dis-
tinguishable in some minor particulars, but the basic question raised
was the same. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had infringed his copy-
right in a map by reproducing the map without his permission in
Collier's magazine, which was sold and distributed nationally. Defen-
dant maintained that the map was in the public domain. Plaintiff had
gathered data for the map while on a government mission to Alaska
in his capacity as executive assistant to the Secretary of Interior. He
was not sent for the purpose of gathering data for the map and did
so of his own initiative. It did not appear whether he spent any
government time in gathering the data. On his return to the United
States, he directed a government employee named Wills to assist him
in drawing the map and Wills did so on government time. The map
was engraved and printed through facilities of the United States
Geological Survey, and plaintiff applied for and received a copyright
on it in his own name. Later he made a slight change on the original
map by drawing red lines to indicate mileage distances between cities.
He did not copyright the map as thus changed. With his knowledge
and approval, ten thousand copies of the map as changed were printed
at government expense by direction of the United States Highway
Commission, and the map was also reproduced in a general govern-
ment publication issued by the Department of Interior. These repro-
ductions contained notices of plaintiff's copyright and credited him as
the source.
Defendant's reproduction was of the map with the red lines added.
However, the court did not base its holding in favor of defendant on
the fact that plaintiff had failed to cover with copyright the map as
changed, although it did say that it considered the map as reproduced
in the Department of Interior publication to be a government publi-
cation and, as such, not subject to copyright,31 The primary ground
on which the decision was rested was that plaintiff brought the map
into being while engaged in government service related to the map's
subject matter, and had it produced on government time through use
of government facilities. That this was the basis of the court's deci-
sion is made clear by the opinion's statement that plaintiff was not
entitled to a copyright on either the map as originally drawn or as
30. 46 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 735 (1944). In the court of appeals decision affirming this case, Swan, J.,
obviously misinterpreted the finding and holding of the district court, in saying
that the basis of decision was that the material in question was produced in the
course of the plaintiff's duties. This was not the basis of the decision, as is shown
more fully in the text following.
31. 46 F. Supp. at 473.
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later changed3 2 The court considered quite significant that plaintiff's
official duties were connected with the area centrally and chiefly de-
picted by the map (Alaska) and emphasized also that both the plain-
tiff and Wills were in the full time employ of the Government.3
There is no suggestion in the opinion of the Sawyer case that a
government employee stands in any different position than a private
employee with respect to literary property rights in his work. The
point on which the opinion differs from the holdings in the Rickover
and Sherrill cases is the degree or amount of connection required be-
tween the material and an employee's paid job functions to warrant
a denial of copyright protection. The courts in Rickover and Sherrill
believed an employee to be entitled to copyright protection in any
material not produced by him as the specific thing which his duties
required him to produce. The court in the Sawyer case felt that an
employee has no claim to protection in any material he produces which
bears a direct relationship in subject matter to his paid job activities.
It should be noted that the Sawyer case also attached weight to the
fact that government time and facilities were utilized in producing
the material, whereas the Rickover case considered these factors to
be of no material consequence whatever.3 - In the Sherrill case, only
the use of government facilities to print the material after its pro-
duction was involved, but the court clearly considered this incon-
sequential.
The weight of case authority in the private master-servant area is
clearly in favor of the view adopted by the Rickover and Sherrill
cases. The two cases cited by the court in the Sawyer case's opinion
do not support the proposition for which they are cited, that "when
an employee creates something in connection with his duties under his
employment, the thing created is the property of the employer .... ."31
In the first of these cases, Brown v. MolM Co.,36 the employee was
hired to create and direct a radio show for the Moll6 Company. It was
necessary for him to obtain a theme song for the program praising
the sponsor's product, and he wrote such a song himself which was
used on the program. The court held he was not entitled to a copy-
right on the song, since "where an employee creates something as part
of his duties under his employment, the thing created is the property
of the employer. '13 There is an obvious and important distinction
between the phrases "in connection with" and "as part of." The latter
32. Id. at 473-74.
33. Id. at 473.
34. Note 22 supra.
35. 46 F. Supp. at 473. (Emphasis added.)
36. 20 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
37. Id. at 136. (Emphasis added.)
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clearly connotes a condition of integrality, whereas the former ex-
presses only an idea of relationship or bearing. The same words were
used in the second of the cited cases, United States Ozone Co. v. United
States Ozone Co. of America,3  which held that a book prepared by
an employee, though registered in his name, was the property of the
employer, because it was prepared "as part of his duties under his
employment."- It thus can be seen that these cases support the prin-
ciple of the Rickover and Sherrill cases rather than that of the Sawyer
case. The same can be said about virtually all of the other cases that
have been found on the subject.40
Writers in the field of copyright law seem definitely aligned in favor
of the view espoused by the Rickover and Sherrill cases. Ball states:
An author who performs literary work for another under a con-
tract of employment will not be deemed to have transferred his
rights therein to his employer unless that is clearly the legal
effect of the contract.4 1
Drone believed that no employer could become the owner of his em-
ployee's literary works not produced in the scope of the duties for
which the latter is employed and paid.4 2
The mere fact of employment does not make the employer the
absolute owner of the literary property created by the person
employed. Where there is no agreement or implied understand-
ing that what is produced shall belong to the employer, it is clear
that the latter acquires no title to the copyright.4 3
No expression of a belief to the contrary by any writer has been
noted.
Even stronger support for this view appears to exist in the lan-
guage of the Copyright Law itself. Section 26 states that the word
"author" as used in the act "shall include an employer in the case of
works made for hire.' ' 4I This would seem to indicate that before an
employer can be considered an "author" for purposes of claiming
copyright protection under the act, there must have been a clear
business understanding at the outset of the employment that the em-
ployee's paid duties would include production of the material in ques-
tion, or that if any such material should be produced it would belong
38. 62 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1932).
39. Id. at 887. (Emphasis added.)
40. See notes 15-18 supra.
41. Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property 569 (1944).
42. Drone, The Law of Property in Intellectual Productions 259 (1879). Al-
though Drone's treatise was published in 1879, it is "still often quoted on funda-
mentals." Howell, The Copyright Law 10 (2d ed. 1948).
43. Drone, op. cit. supra note 42, at 257.
44. 35 Stat. 1087 (1909), 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
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solely to the employer.45 Under this view, the employer can take a
simple step to obtain complete assurance that whatever an employee
produces in the way of literary property during the term of employ-
ment will be the property of the employer.
Analogous cases in the field of patent law dealing with employees'
rights to their inventions, such as that of United States v. Dubilier
Codenaser Corp.4" cited by the court in the Rickover case, weigh heav-
ily in favor of the view that an employee should have exclusive prop-
erty rights as against his employer in his creations not produced as
an essential part of his paid duties, in the absence of a clear agree-
ment to the contrary existing prior to the creations. 4  Use of the
employer's time and facilities in making an invention has been con-
sidered of little or no significance.48 Courts in these cases have
stressed the desirability from a policy standpoint of stimulating and
rewarding individual efforts toward creativity. The court in the
Rickover case considered this to be a desirable policy also in the field
of copyrights,49 and certainly such policy appears consistent with the
fundamental purpose of the Copyright Law, to encourage, promote
and protect the literary contributions of persons. 0
In view of all the above considerations, it appears conclusive that
the rationale of the Rickover and Sherrill cases is the most just and
reasonable one for determination of the literary property rights of
government employees, and that the position taken by the Sawyer
case should be disregarded. The policy reason mentioned in the
Rickover case, i.e., the necessity and importance of encouraging indi-
viduals. to make literary and scientific contributions, would seem
sufficiently strong of itself to warrant this conclusion. An additional
reason, perhaps of equal force, is that under the Sawyer view there
exists no definitely ascertainable criterion by which to determine when
45. See Howell, op. cit. supra note 42, at 51-52.
46. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
47. Dovel v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 139 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 740 (1944); Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.
1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928); Kay-Scheerer Corp. v. American Steril-
izer Co., 5 F. Supp. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1932); Amdyco Corp. v. Urquhart, 39 F.2d 943
(E.D.Pa. 1930), aff'd, 51 F.2d 1072 (3rd Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 689
(1932); C. V. Mosby Co. v. Jones, 303 Ill. App. 234, 24 N.E.2d 873 (1940); Nat'l
Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944) ; Gear Grinding Mach. Co.
v. Stuber, 282 Mich. 455, 276 N.W. 514 (1937); Atlas Brick Co. v. North, 2
S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Barlow & Seelig Mfg. Co. v. Patch, 232 Wis.
220, 286 N.W. 577 (1939).
48. See Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890) and cases cited in
note 47 supra.
49. 177 F. Supp. at 604-05.
50. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909);
Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property § 5 (1944).
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a government employee would ever be entitled to obtain copyright
protection of his literary products, except in rare instances when such
products have absolutely no bearing whatever upon his official duties,
and possibly also when not a minute of government time was used
in any way in the production of the material. It will be recalled that
in the Sawyer case the court looked to whether the subject matter of
the employee's product was "connected with" his job activities.!;
Does this mean any kind or degree of connection, or only a "close"
connection? Avocational writers frequently choose subjects in some
way connected with or related to their regular occupations. A prison
warden might write an article or deliver a speech on prevention of
escapes. Any government employee might keep a diary or journal of
his job activities and experiences. A military band director might
compose a march. A lighthouse keeper who may be technically "on
duty" twenty-four hours a day might prepare charts or maps of
coastlines as a mere means of whiling the time away. In all of these
hypothetical instances, no one could seriously dispute that the em-
ployee should be entitled to full protection and enjoyment of the fruits
of his purely voluntary efforts. And yet, there is no doubt that in
each case a fairly close connection exists between the job and the
material produced.12 Under the view of the Sawyer case, such an
employee would have no way of knowing whether he would be able
to secure and enjoy copyright protection if any member of the public
should happen to challenge his right.
Under the test applied in the Rickover and Sherrill cases, no such
difficulty is presented. The material will be wholly the employee's to
own and enjoy unless it can be shown to have been produced as a
very thing that the employee was obliged to produce in the course
of performing his paid job functions.
It might be argued that the view of the Rickover and Sherrill cases,
if followed, would encourage government employees to shirk their
paid duties and use government time and facilities to advance their
own interests, to the detriment of the public. In this regard, it is
appropriate to return to the inquiry of whether government em-
ployees should be treated differently than privately employed persons
in the area of literary property rights. They have not been treated
differently in the patent law area and no case seems even to have
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intimated that a different manner of treatment is called for in the
copyright field. It would seem that there is even less reason for treat-
ing them differently in copyright law in view of the fact that making
physical inventions customarily entails working with external objects
while creation of literary property largely is accomplished by thought
processes. No feasible method has yet been devised to prevent think-
ing of other things besides one's tasks while working. As indicated
previously, the almost unanimous view of the cases involving pri-
vately employed persons has been in accord with the view of the
Rickover and Sherrill cases. The court in Rickover noted, regarding
use of government time and facilities, that the Government or the
particular federal agency involved can effectively control the situa-
tion by appropriate regulations or intradepartmental action. 3 The
court also noted that the Government had declined an invitation to
appear in the action as amicus curiae, and thus it was inferable that
the Government did not wish to assert any paramount title, or to
claim that the literary property involved was in the public domain."
In conclusion, the fact that a person is employed by the Govern-
ment and is therefore a "public servant" surely does not mean that
he is a slave or an indentured servant who has sold in advance all of
his intellectual and creative products to the Government or the public,
any more than a private employee has sold such products to his em-
ployer. It is submitted that no basis exists for distinguishing the
positions of government and private employees with respect to liter-
ary property rights. Thus, in deciding cases involving the literary
property rights of government employees, courts can and should look
for guiding precedent to similar cases involving privately employed
persons. The Rickover and Sherrill cases did this, and applied the
test which is solidly backed by the weight of authority and by reason
and justice as well. This test provides the clearest and most work-
able criterion available for determining whether an employee should
be accorded copyright protection of his literary products, namely,
whether the products were produced voluntarily and not as a part
of the duties he was obliged to perform in the course of his paid
employment.
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